Equilibrium Unemployment and Credit Market Imperfections: The Critical Role of Labour Mobility by Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka
A joint Initiative of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität and Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Working Papers
January 2002
Category 4: Labour Markets
CESifo
Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany




An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.de
EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT AND
CREDIT MARKET IMPERFECTIONS: THE
CRITICAL ROLE OF LABOUR MOBILITY
ERKKI KOSKELA
RUNE STENBACKA
CESifo Working Paper No. 654 (4)CESifo Working Paper No. 654
January 2002
EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT AND CREDIT MARKET
IMPERFECTIONS: 
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF LABOUR MOBILITY
Abstract
We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market
imperfections for the determination of equilibrium unemployment within the
framework of the "right-tomanage" approach. Our analysis highlights the
critical role of labour mobility for the evaluation of the employment
implications of intensified credit market competition. Without labour mobility
increased bargaining power of banks will have adverse employment effects.
However, with a labour force mobile across industries this relationship is
frequently reversed if firms adopt profit sharing schemes. If employment at a
fixed wage complements unemployment benefits to constitute the trade
union's relevant outside option, intensified credit market competition will
increase equilibrium unemployment. This relationship is shown to hold also
for cases where the outside option incorporates profit sharing schemes as
long as the labour market imperfections – measured by the relative
bargaining power of the trade unions - are sufficiently strong.
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European unemployment rate has shown a rising trend during the last twenty-five years.
This has raised the question of how to explain this development. Without going explic-
itly into that issue, which is still partly unresolved, one should notice that at the moment
there are several complementary approaches to study and explain high European unem-
ployment. In this context various versions of the union bargaining theory have been
quite popular. This is natural as in most European countries over three quarters of the
workforce are still covered by collective bargaining. 
In the present study we examine the interaction of labour and credit market imperfec-
tions for the determination of equilibrium unemployment within the framework of the
“right-to-manage” approach. In the credit market loan contracts are negotiated between
financiers and firms, both possessing bargaining power, whereas the firms and organ-
ized labour bargain over the base wage in the imperfectly competitive labour market.
These two types of negotiations take place sequentially and are assumed to be condi-
tional on the firm having committed itself to the form of wage contract determining to
what extent it makes use of performance-related profit sharing in addition to the negoti-
ated base wage. More specifically, we study the impact of alternative outside options –
largely related to labour force mobility - for the relationship between credit market
competition and equilibrium unemployment.
An emerging literature has focused on the interaction between corporate finance, wage
and employment policies. Bronars and Deere (1991), Perotti and Spier (1993) as well as
Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) demonstrate how firms can use debt as a strategic in-
strument to reduce the costs that unionized workers can impose on shareholders through
their collective bargaining power. Koskela and Stenbacka (2000c) develop a unified
framework to simultaneously deal with the determination of wages, employment, em-
ployee effort, profit sharing and the choice of capital structure by firms. However, they
do not fully analyze the interaction between the labour and credit markets, because the
determination of the interest rate in the credit market is not endogenized. 4
The literature focusing on the interaction between credit and labour markets, both char-
acterized by market imperfections, is currently quite thin. Wasmer and Weil (2000) in-
vestigate this issue within the framework of a model with job search, credit matching
frictions and negotiated mark-ups in the labour and credit markets. Their model gener-
ates a decompostion of unemployment into two parts, one depending on labour market
imperfections and the other one depending on credit market imperfections. These imper-
fections exhibit interaction in the form of a credit multiplier such that the credit market
imperfections amplify the unemployment generated through the imperfections in the
labour market.
1 Acemoglu (2001) presents another mechanism for how credit market
frictions may contribute to unemployment. Abstracting from labour market imperfec-
tions he demonstrates how failures in the credit market to channel funds to socially
valuable projects can have a substantial impact on unemployment, in particular in the
"medium" run. 
Our present analysis makes it possible to characterize the relationship between equilib-
rium unemployment and the competitiveness of the credit market for environments
where firms apply performance-related wage contracts relying on profit sharing. We
study the important issue of how this relationship depends on labour mobility, which
plays a major role in determining the nature of outside options relevant for the labour
market negotiations. In our framework the presence of a performance-related wage
component in the form of profit sharing is a necessary condition for the relationship
between the competitiveness of the credit market and equilibrium unemployment.
2 We
confirm the intuitively appealing conjecture that intensified credit market competition
will promote employment under two distinct types of circumstances: (1) a labour force
which is perfectly immobile across industries or (2) a labour force which is mobile
across industries which all adopt profit sharing as long as labour markets exhibit suffi-
ciently small bargaining power of trade unions and face policies with sufficiently high
benefit-replacement ratios. 
                                                
1 Our model differs in several respects from that of Wasmer and Weil (2000). Firstly, our results heavily
depend on the general equilibrium analysis, which is important, because, in contrast to studies based on a
partial equilibrium analysis, wage increases affect the outside option available to union members. Sec-
ondly, we operate with more general wage contracts. In fact, most of the analysis in Wasmer and Weil is
restricted to exogenous base wages with no performance-related elements.
2 Under perfectly competitive credit markets the equilibrium unemployment is independent of the credit
market characteristics, because under such conditions the firm finds it optimal not to adopt profit sharing.5
However, with a labour force mobile across industries this relationship is reversed if
employment at a fixed wage complements unemployment benefits to constitute the trade
union's relevant outside option. Then intensified credit market competition will always
increase equilibrium unemployment. This relationship can be shown to hold also for
cases where the outside option incorporates profit sharing schemes as long as the labour
market imperfections – measured by the relative bargaining power of the trade unions -
are sufficiently strong. 
This seemingly paradoxical result - that intensified credit market competition might in-
crease equilibrium unemployment - can intuitively be explained by reference to an "out-
side option effect".  A decrease in the repayment rate directly improves employment
conditions, but it also induces a wage rise with the opposite effect. Moreover, labour
force mobility induces the value of the trade union's outside option to increase so as to
outweigh the increased direct cost of financing. Finally, a lower degree of market im-
perfections in the credit market will induce lower profit shares. Even though lower
profit shares will have no direct employment effect, they will depress employment by
increasing the negotiated base wage. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In section II we present the basic structure of the
model including the time sequence of decisions under circumstances where a represen-
tative firm operates in an environment characterized by uncertainty and thereby bank-
ruptcy risk. Employment is studied in section III, while in section IV we explore the
determination of the repayment rate as well as the base wage through a process of Nash
bargaining in the credit and labour markets, respectively. Section V explores the impli-
cations of credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment under circum-
stances where labour mobility across industries, and thereby the outside options relevant
for wage negotiations, vary. Finally, we summarize and offer concluding comments in
section VI.
II. The Basic Framework
We consider a financially constrained firm operating in an environment characterized
by uncertainty. Production requires the firm to employ homogeneous workers within the
framework of a unionized labour market. By employing labour input L the firm is able6
to generate random revenues, γ , which are distributed continuously with
0 > γ according to the conditional density function
3 
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where  0 ) ( ' < L λ  and  0 ) ( " > L λ . Thus, a rise in Lwill shift density to higher returns at a
decreasing rate. 
In order to focus on the interaction between imperfections in credit markets and labour
markets we assume that the firm has to finance its operations exclusively by debt. For a
firm facing a credit market with a prevailing interest rate r, the effective labour cost can
be written as  w w w r ~ ) 1 ( = ∆ = + , where ∆ is the repayment rate.
4 Faced with an ordi-
nary debt contract exhibiting limited liability, the risk-neutral firm decides on the level
of employment L in order to maximize its expected profits,  π E , defined by
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For the derivation of the RHS expression of (2) we have applied integration by parts and
used the specification  (1). In (2) the lower bound of the range of integration  L w ~ ˆ = γ
denotes the ”break-even” state of nature, in which the firm is just able to remain solvent.
The workers must be paid prior to production and the generated conditional revenues
are either sufficient to make the firm survive or not. According to (2) the firm's attention
is restricted to the upper tail of the distribution of project returns ) ˆ ( γ γ≥ , while owner-
ship of the project shifts to the bank in case the firm cannot fulfill its contractual obli-
gation. Thus, the firm is bankrupt when  . ˆ γ γ<  
In the long run the firm commits itself to the form of the wage contract delineating to
what extent it will make use of performance-related profit sharing. The profit share, τ ,
determines what fraction of the firm’s profits will be transferred to employed workers as
                                                
3 This kind of specification in a more general form has been used in Koskela – Stenbacka (2000a).7
part of the contract. Conditional on the structure of compensation to organized labour
the firm and the trade union engage in wage bargaining. The firm-union negotiations at
this stage determine the base wage, w, to be paid to all workers employed by the firm as
the outcome of Nash bargaining. Conditional on the outcome of the wage bargaining, in
its turn, the firm and the bank negotiate over the firm's repayment rate  r + = ∆ 1.
Together with the negotiated base wage this repayment rate determines the effective
cost of production for the firm. We again apply the Nash bargaining solution as the out-
come of the firm-financier negotiations determining the firm's cost of debt financing.
Finally, the firm unilaterally decides on employment once the negotiations in the labour
and credit markets are settled. This sequential bargaining - with sequential separation of
the negotiations in the labour and credit markets - seems to us not only natural but also
essential for our purpose of studying the impact of the interaction between labour and
credit markets on equilibrium unemployment.  
We summarize the time sequence of the decisions made by the firm, the financier and
the trade union in Figure 1. We proceed by applying backward induction and thereby
solving the game in reverse order by starting to investigate the determination of em-
ployment in the next section.
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Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
                                                                                                                                              
4 In principle, the analysis could be extended to more general capital structures meaning that the firm
would have to finance the fraction  ) 1 0 ( ≤ ≤δ δ of labour costs by debt. In such a generalized case the8
III. Employment Determination
At this stage the firm has committed itself to a profit sharing system and the negotia-
tions in the labour and credit markets have fixed the base wage and the repayment rate.
Thus, the effective cost of employing L workers can be expressed as  L w ∆ , thereby
exhibiting a straightforward dependence on the negotiated base wage and repayment
rate, respectively. In order to simplify the presentation we make the following assump-
tion
5 regarding the production technology.
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so that an increase in employment shifts the density to higher returns at a decreasing
rate. To investigate the firm’s optimal employment determination we differentiate (2)
with respect to L to obtain the first-order condition  
(3)  [] 0 ~ ) ( ˆ ) ( 1 ) ( '
2 = − + − w L L L λ γ λ λ .
Using the specification (A1) for  ) (L λ we can explicitly express the firm’s optimal em-
ployment 
* L  
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 is the elasticity of employment with respect to the effective wage rate
w w ∆ = ~ . According to (4) the firm’s optimal employment exhibits constant elasticity
with respect to the wage and the repayment rates. Further, to the extent that an increased
                                                                                                                                              
effective labour cost could be written as  w w w r w r w ~ ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = ∆ = + = + + −δ δ δ δ .
5 In what follows the derivatives are noted by primes for functions with one argument and the partial de-
rivatives by subscripts for functions with many arguments. Hence for example  dL L d L / ) ( ) ( ' λ λ= , while
, / ) , ( ) , ( x y x A y x Ax ∂ ∂ =  etc.9
interest rate contributes to the firm's leverage, (4) suggests that the higher is the firm’s
leverage rate, the lower is employment, ceteris paribus. Notice also that labour demand
does not depend directly on the profit sharing parameter τ .
6 Substituting the optimal
employment (4) into the firm’s expected profit function yields the following expected















As the negotiating parties in the credit and labour markets anticipate the firm’s em-
ployment decision, (5) is the relevant profit expression for the subsequent bargaining
analyses. 
IV. Nash Bargaining in the Credit and Labour Markets
We now turn to the analysis of the second stage of the game, the determination of the
cost of external funds, captured by the repayment rate, ∆, in the credit market. 
IV. 1. Repayment Rate Bargaining
In the literature there is no unique and standardized way to characterize the intensity of
lending rate competition. In traditional oligopoly models the consequences of increased
competition are often analyzed by increasing the number of competing lenders. Another
approach, frequently applied in the area of industrial organization, is to measure the in-
tensity of competition by the degree of product differentiation like, for example, in the
Hotelling type models of horizontal product differentiation. A third way of capturing the
degree of credit market imperfections is to identify these with the lender’s bargaining
power relative to that of the borrower, i.e. to apply the Nash bargaining approach. This
is the approach we will apply in the present analysis.
7 For our purposes this approach
                                                
6 Empirical evidence from USA (see e.g. Sharpe (1994) and Hanka (1998)), from UK (see e.g. Nickell
and Wadhwani (1991) and Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999)) as well as from Germany (see e.g. Funke, Mau-
rer and Strulik (1999)) lies in conformity with the prediction that the firm’s leverage will have a negative
effect on employment. Moreover, direct independence of employment also lies in conformity with em-
pirical evidence from UK (see Wadhwani and Wall (1990)) and France (see Cahuc and Dormont (1997)).
7 For applications of the Nash bargaining approach to analyze lending martket competition in slightly
different contexts we refer to Koskela and Stenbacka (2000b), Besci and Li and Wang (2000) and Was-
mer and Weil (2000). See also Bester (1995), who has analyzed the foundations of loan contracts by ref-10
has two advantages: it both incorporates the polar market structures of monopoly and
perfect competition as special cases and it avoids incorporation of market-specific, and
often controversial, institutional details (like the precise type of competition) of credit
markets as a part of the analysis.
The financier of the firm’s project, the bank, is assumed to be risk-neutral and we  ex-
press its expected profit function as 
(6) [] () ∫ − + − − ∆ = ∆
γ
γ γ γ γ
ˆ
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where the first term describes the bank’s expected profits (net of funding costs) in states
of nature where the firm remains solvent, while the second term delineates the expected
profits accruing to the bank when bankruptcy occurs. The first term incorporates a nor-
malization whereby the bank's opportunity cost of granting finance is zero. The pa-
rameter h denotes the bankruptcy costs capturing the idea that it may be costly to liqui-
date a project failing to fulfill the repayment obligation determined by the debt contract.
In particular, h=0 covers the limiting case of a perfectly liquid project which would
have the same value to outsiders as to the firm, while h=1 covers the limiting case of
infinitely high bankruptcy costs.
8 
The combination of (2), whereby the base wage to unionized workers is paid prior to
production, and (6) means that workers have priority claims relative to banks in case
bankruptcy occurs. But, on the other hand, as a residual claimant relative to the "break-
even" state of nature, the bank has priority relative to performance-related components
in the compensation scheme offered to workers.  
Using integration by parts we can re-write the expected profit function of the financier
as follows
(7) [] 1 ) , ( ) (
* − ∆ = ∆η h x L w EB   ,
                                                                                                                                              
erence to a process of bilateral bargaining in a financial market where the investor delegates the activities
of searching for investment projects and bargaining with the entrepreneur to a financial intermediary. 
8 For an illuminating  general discussion of different approaches to bankruptcy procedures and bank-
ruptcy costs we refer to Hart (2000).11
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L  denotes the probability of the firm remaining solvent. Thus,
the bank's expected profit is an increasing function of the probability of solvency as
long as bankruptcy costs, h, are not too small.
9   
The repayment is assumed to be determined as the outcome of bargaining between the
financier and the firm subject to the constraint that the firm unilaterally decides the level
of employment in line with the well-established “right-to-manage” approach.
10 We fur-
ther assume that the zero expected profits represent the threat point of both the firm and
the financier. In such a situation the determination of ∆ can be modeled as the solution
to the following Nash bargaining problem 
(8) [] [] 0 . . ) ( ) ( ) (
* 1 * = ∆ ∆ = ∆ Ψ
−
∆ L E t s E EB Max π π
µ µ  ,
where  µ  and  µ − 1  denote the relative bargaining power of the financier and the firm,
respectively. The first-order condition for this bargaining problem can be expressed as
11













As the firm unilaterally optimizes employment, we can apply the envelope theorem to
see that   0 )) ˆ ( 1 (
ˆ ) * ( * * * < − = − − =
−
∆
γ λ γ π
L e L w F L w E . For the effect of the repayment
rate on the expected profit of the bank we have  [] . ) 1 ( ) , (
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the optimal labour demand (4) we get the result that the probability of solvency for the
                                                
9 With very small bankruptcy costs the bank would, in fact, have an incentive to "go for the broke". Such
a possibility is discussed in Hart (2000). Intuitively it emerges as a consequence of the fact that in the
presence of small bankruptcy costs liquidation of the project would yield a high return to the bank.
10 Here we follow the ‘right –to-manage’ approach in the credit market negotiations. While it is common
in the analyses of labour markets, one can ask how well it fits credit markets. Concerning credit markets
this is a subject for further research.    12
firm is determined by
η γ
− = −
1 *)) ˆ ( 1 ( e L F , which is constant and independent of the ef-
fective wage rate  w w ∆ = ~ .
12  Combining these formulations we can re-express the
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e h h x  we can conclude from (10) that the
negotiated repayment rate depends on four factors: (i) the firm’s probability of solvency
(
η − 1 e ), (ii) the elasticity of labour (and debt) demand (η), (iii) the bankruptcy costs (h)
and (iv)  the relative bargaining power of the financier (µ ). The repayment rate de-
pends positively on the relative bargaining power of the financier, the bankruptcy costs
and on the probability of bankruptcy (
η γ
− − =
1 * 1 ) ˆ ( e L F ) in the realistic case where the
bankruptcy costs are not too small. 
We summarize our analysis of the bargaining taking place in the credit market in
Proposition 1 The Nash bargaining repayment rate given by (10) depends positively on
the relative bargaining power of the bank as well as on the bankruptcy costs. Further, it
is positively related to the bankruptcy risk of the project as long as the bankruptcy costs
are not too small. 
It is worth emphasizing that due to the constant effective wage elasticity of labour de-
mand the Nash bargaining solution (10) is independent of the wage rate w, and thereby
of the relative bargaining power of the labour market participants. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
11 We assume that the sufficient second-order condition for the Nash bargaining problem holds. 
12 Proof: Substituting the labour demand and the specification for  ) (L λ  for the expression of the prob-
ability of solvency gives 
η αη η αη
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IV. 2.  Nash Bargaining and Wage Structure
We now turn to analyze the wage negotiations between the union and the firm, both
possessing market power. In the wage negotiations the firm and union take the profit
share τ  as given and behave in anticipation of optimal employment determination as
well as the subsequently negotiated bargaining outcome regarding the repayment rate in
the credit market.
IV.2.1. Wage  Bargaining 
We write the linear utilitarian objective function of the trade union as 
                b L N E
L
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where the first term captures the rent to the employed and the second term that to the
unemployed union members. With probability  ) ˆ (
* L F γ  the firm confronts bankruptcy,
in which case the worker receives nothing on top of the base wage. The base wage is
paid out prior to resolution of the uncertainty. With the complementary probability,
) ˆ ( 1
* L F γ − , the firm remains solvent and the employed union member is remunerated
according to the compensation contract, i.e. the sum of the base wage, w, negotiated
with the firm and the share of the profit realization, 
* L τ , determined by the firm. Note
that these probabilities are incorporated in the objective function of the union through
the expected profits 
* π E . The parameterb  denotes the trade union's outside option. 
We denote the relative bargaining power of the union by β , and, consequently, that of
the firm by  ) 1 ( β − , and assume that the threat points of the trade union and the firm can
be described by  Nb EU
o =  and  0 =
o Eπ , respectively.  Applying the Nash bargaining
solution the negotiating parties decide on the base wage w in order to maximize 
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bargaining solution satisfies the following first-order condition
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EUw . Utilizing these together
with the trade union’s expected rent relative to the outside option, 
o EU , we can explic-
itly solve the first-order condition (12) with respect to the base wage. Through such a














According to (13) the negotiated wage rate is a multiple of the outside option and it de-
pends positively on the relative bargaining power of the trade union whereas negatively
on the repayment rate 
N ∆  as long as the firm adopts profit sharing. Hence the interest
rate r (and also the leverage rate δ  if that were explicitly included) will have wage-
moderating effects, which, however, disappear in the absence of profit sharing.
14 Fur-
ther, we can conclude that the negotiated wage depends negatively on the expected
profit share, i.e. the product of the probability of solvency, 
η − 1 e , and the profit share, τ
Moreover, in the presence of profit sharing the Nash bargaining solution is negatively
related to the relative bargaining power of the financier, µ .
We summarize our characterization of the negotiated base wage in
                                                
13  We assume that the sufficient second-order condition for the Nash bargaining problem holds. 
14 This lies in conformity with the econometric evidence, based on panel data on a large number of UK
companies, reported in Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999).15
Proposition 2 In the presence of profit sharing the Nash bargaining the wage rate is
decreasing as a function of the repayment rate, the expected profit share and the rela-
tive bargaining power of the financier, while it is increasing as a function of the relative
bargaining power of the trade union and likewise of the probability of bankruptcy, if the
bankruptcy costs are not too small.
  
Hence the negotiated wage is negatively related to the intensity of competition prevail-
ing in the credit market  (in the sense of lower µ ) when wage contracts incorporate a
performance-related component in the form of profit sharing. 
IV.2.2.  Determination of Profit Sharing
Performance-related compensation is a common phenomenon in industrialized econo-
mies. For example, in Finland The Confederation of Finnish Industry and Empoyers
conducted a survey in 1999 and found that more than 50 percent of all its member firms
apply performance-related compensation schemes. Profit sharing refers to renumeration
mechanisms where the traditional fixed-wage remuneration is replaced by a scheme
with a fixed base wage plus a share of profits or revenues of firms. For similar evidence
regarding the frequency of profit sharing in, for example, U.K. and France we refer to
Wadhwani and Wall (1990) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997). For a more extensive sur-
vey of why firms might adopt profit sharing plans we refer to Kruse (1996). Weitzman
(1985) argues that the profit sharing system leads to better business cycle performance
when compared to a fixed wage system and conjectures that profit sharing systems will
also  reduce equilibrium unemployment (Weitzman 1987). 
Our analysis now proceeds to the first stage of the game in order to analyze the firm's
optimal commitment to the wage structure in the form of a profit share. As we have
seen in the previous sections the profit share will subsequently impact on the negotiated
wage and thereby on employment. The firm's optimal decision with respect to the profit
share has to take these effects into account.
15
                                                
15 A number of contributions to the literature on wage bargaining, for example, Jerger and Michaelis
(1999), Holmlund (1991), Pohjola (1987) and Anderson and Devereux (1989) have analyzed profit shar-
ing within a framework where the union-firm negotiations include profit shares in addition to base wages.
In this literature the profit shares are determined simultaneously with base wages, a feature which can be
questioned on grounds of realism. For example, in Finland the Confederation of Finnish Industry and16
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The first-order condition (15) exhibits that the optimal profit share is determined so that
the negative dilution effect (the first term) is counterbalanced by the positive wage-
moderating effect of the profit share τ  (the second  term).
Substituting (16a) and (16b) into (15) and rearranging gives the following explicit inte-
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One can see that profit sharing is adopted by the firm if  1
1 > ∆
− N e
η . Using (10) for the
repayment rate 
N ∆  we can define the value of the critical bankruptcy cost 
* h  for which
                                                                                                                                              
Employers has declared publicly that it does not negotiate regarding performance-related compensation
schemes.17

























 profit sharing is utilized if 
* h h >  so that higher bank-
ruptcy costs make it more likely that the firm will adopt profit sharing. Such a relation-
ship between profit sharing and bankruptcy costs appeals to intuition, since higher bank-
ruptcy costs increase the negotiated interest rate, which enhances the incentives to adopt
profit sharing. In the limiting case with infinitely high bankruptcy costs we can write the
















First, according to (18) the adoption of profit sharing requires a positive relative bar-
gaining power of the financier. In the case of perfect competition in the credit market
the optimal profit sharing is zero and the interaction between labour and credit markets
will then disappear under our assumed production function (A1). This is a natural fea-
ture because then the profit share does not have wage-moderating effects so as to offset
the dilution effect. Thus, the optimal profit share increases with the relative bargaining
power of the financier, because the induced base wage moderation increases the firm's
incentives to use profit sharing. Secondly, the firm’s incentives to use of the profit
sharing instrument is not affected by the degree of competition in the labour market,
because the repayment rate (10) is independent of the wage rate.
16
We summarize our findings of this section in 
Proposition 3 The optimal profit share is increasing as a function of the relative bar-
gaining power of the bank in the credit market, while independent of the bargaining
power of the firm in the labour market. Higher bankruptcy costs increase the likelihood
and degree of profit sharing. Finally, for a competitive credit market the firm finds it
optimal not to adopt the profit sharing instrument.
      
                                                
16 This is because in our model the wage elasticity of labour demand is constant due to the assumption of
the Cobb-Douglas production function .  In more general cases this might not hold. 18
Thus, higher bargaining power of the lender induces a shift towards a higher degree of
performance-related pay. Such a higher profit share will generate a moderation of base
wages and thereby affect employment. 
V. Equilibrium  Unemployment with Credit Market
Imperfections: The Role of Labour Mobility 
After having studied the interaction between the determination of the wage structure and
the repayment rate conditional on labour demand we now integrate the elements devel-
oped so far in order to explore the relationship between total employment and imper-
fections in the labour and credit markets, measured by the relative bargaining powers of
the negotiating parties. Earlier we observed that imperfections in the labour and credit
markets might have opposite effects on the negotiated base wage if the workers have
access to an exogenous outside option. The negotiated base wage was found to be an
increasing function of the trade union's relative bargaining power, whereas a decresing
function of the bank's relative bargaining power in the credit market as long as profit
sharing schemes are adopted. 
V.1. Immobile Labour: Unemployment Benefit as the Outside Option 
Let us first consider the role of the degree of credit market imperfection, measured by
the relative bargaining power of the financier, µ  for employment when labour is im-
moble across industries. If labour is completely immobile across industries, exogenous
unemployment benefits constitute the relevant outside option for workers at the stage of
wage negotiations. For such a case the employment effect of a change in µ  can be ex-
pressed as 
(19)









































An increase in the relative bargaining power of the financier influences employment in
three different ways. Firstly, there is the direct effect, whereby the employment falls as
a consequence of an increase in the negotiated repayment rate factor (the first term on19
the RHS). In addition, there are two offsetting effects operating through the mechanism
for wage formation. The negotiated wage rate is moderated secondly, directly through
an induced reduction in the base wage and thirdly, indirectly via an induced increase in
the profit share. Both of these effects stimulate employment (the second term on the
RHS). 
Substituting the relevant expressions into (19) and rearranging gives 























Therefore, despite the offsetting effects we can conclude that the direct effects of a
change in the relative bargaining power of the bank dominate the indirect effects via the
wage and profit share determination independently of the relative size of the bargaining
power of trade union in the labour market. Consequently, with a perfectly immobile la-
bour force with the exogenous outside option it holds that more intense competition in
the credit market unambigously generates lower unemployment.
17
Thus, we can summarize our finding regarding the relationship between the competi-
tiveness of the credit market and the equilibrium unemployment in the absence of la-
bour mobility in  
Proposition 4 With a perfectly immobile labour force intensified credit market compe-
tition will lower equilibrium unemployment by inducing higher wages as long as firms
apply performance-related wage contracts. 
V.2. Mobile Labour:  Outside Options with No Profit Sharing 
Next we investigate how credit and labour market imperfections will impact on equilib-
rium unemployment from a perspective where labour is mobile across industries. In this
respect we separate the cases where outside industries apply compensation schemes in-
corporating base wages alone from cases where the relevant outside option additionally20
includes profit shares. Initially we focus on the case where base wages offered in other
industries constitute the relevant outside option to reflect a case where profit sharing
schemes are rare.
According to (13) for each representative industry the wage-determining Nash bargain-
ing solution has the form
(21)   b w i
N










N i , where, in principle, the variables on the RHS are industry-
specific. We assume that all industries are identical in the sense that  A Ai = . In a gen-
eral equilibrium context the term b could, in line e.g. with Jerger and Michaelis (1999),
be interpreted to be the outside option given by 
(22) uB w u b + − = ) 1 ( ,
where u denotes the unemployment rate, B the unemployment benefit and w is the ne-
gotiated wage rate in all the identical industries  (for a standard justification of this in-
terpretation we refer to Layard et.al (1991)) p. 100-101 and Nickell and Layard (1999),
p. 3048-3050)). Here we have assumed that the economywide base wage and unem-
ployment benefit are components of the outside option of relevance for the wage nego-
tiation.   We further restrict ourselves to the case of a constant replacement ratio





















1 η τ β .
In the presence of profit sharing in the industry under consideration we can conclude
that  
                                                                                                                                              
17 It could emphasized that the partial equilibrium employment effect of credit market competition is in-
variant to whether profit sharing is applied or not. As we can see from  (20), however, profit sharing af-
fects the magnitude of the employment effect.  21
(24) . 0







































Hence, in a general equilibrium context with labour mobility intensified credit market
competition will increase equilibrium unemployment. The economic intuition explain-
ing this seemingly paradoxical finding goes as follows: A rise in µ  will increase the
repayment rate. This has two offsetting effects in a setting with labour immobility: On
the one hand, the effective labour cost increases as a result of a rise in ∆ and on the
other hand, in the presence of profit sharing, higher ∆ leads to wage moderation, which
decreases the effective labour cost. In the case of immobile labour – analyzed in the
earlier section - the former effect dominates and employment falls. But in the case of
mobile labour wage moderation induces the value of the outside option to decrease,
which tends to enhance employment. In addition, as shown in Proposition 3, a higher
degree of market imperfections in the credit market will induce higher profit shares.
Even though higher profit shares will have no direct employment effect (see (4)), higher
profit shares will stimulate employment by reducing the negotiated base wage.
18 Alto-
gether the outside option effect now dominates so that higher relative bargaining power
of the financier in the credit market is associated with lower equilibrium unemployment. 
Thus, in the presence of performance-related wage contracts we can summarize our
findings regarding the relationship between the competitiveness of the credit market and
the equilibrium unemployment in the following proposition. 
Proposition 5 With a mobile labour force and with profit sharing not being part of the
relevant outside option, intensified credit market competition will raise equilibrium un-
employment, because it induces wage-enhancing effects causing an increase in the out-
side option available to union members. 
It can be seen from (23) that  0 > ∂ ∂ q u
N , 0 > ∂ ∂β
N u  and  0 < ∂ ∂τ
N u  Hence, the
equilibrium unemployment increases with the benefit replacement ratio q and the rela22
tive bargaining power of the trade union, whereas it decreases with the magnitude of
profit sharing. 
By substituting  0 = τ  into the definition of A we find equilibrium unemployment to be






N  , which is independent of the credit market character-
istics. Thus, profit sharing is a necessary condition for there to be a link between credit
market imperfections and equilibrium unemployment. Furthermore, by substituting

















 so that credit
market imperfections represent a necessary condition for firms to apply profit sharing in
the first place. 
As one can see from Propositions 4 and 5, the mechanism of profit sharing serves as the
bridge between the credit and labour markets. In our model the credit market negotia-
tions affect the wage formation and thereby equilibrium unemployment through the
mechanism of rent formation, but not through the impact on the wage elasticity of em-
ployment. In the presence of profit sharing a change in the repayment rate will have a
negative effect on the wage rate and thereby on equilibrium unemployment. On the
other hand, in the absence of profit sharing this link between labour and credit markets
disappears since the wage rate and thereby the equilibrium unemployment does not de-
pend on the repayment rate.  
V 3. Mobile Labour:  Profit Sharing as Part of the Outside Option
In the previous section the outside option, characterized by (22), was designed to match
an environment with industries not adopting profit sharing. However, it is possible that
an industry, which makes use of profit sharing, also might induce other industries to be-
have in a similar way. Furthermore, the evidence, presented in section IV.2.2, regarding
the frequency by which profit sharing schemes are adopted, offers additional support in
favour of incorporating profit shares in the relevant outside option once the labour force
is mobile. Next we turn to consider this case. 
                                                                                                                                              
18 It is important to emphasize that his feature would be further reinforced if our model would include
efficiency wage considerations (like in Koskela and Stenbacka (2000c)), because in such a context higher23
In a general equilibrium context with perfect labour mobility across industries the term
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We further restrict ourselves to the case of a constant replacement ratio  w B q / ≡ .


























X  and where  1 > A  describes the mark-up factor between the out-
side option b  and the negotiated base wage 
N w .  Differentiating (26) with respect to
the bargaining power of the financier µ   - remembering that µ  affects the unemploy-
ment rate through the mark-up factor  A, the repayment rate ∆ as well as the profit
sharing τ  -  yields the following relationship
(27)
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The function  ) , ( η β g , defined in (27), is strictly decreasing as a function of β  with
0 ) 1 ( ) , (
2 2 < − + − =η β η η β β g  and it satisfies the boundary conditions 1 ) , 0 ( = η g
and  0 ) 1 ( 1 ) , 1 ( < − − =η η g . 
From (27) we can conclude that the impact of credit market imperfections on equilib-
rium unemployment is determined by the interplay between labour market institutions
(captured by β ), labour market policy (captured by the replacement ratio q) and market
                                                                                                                                              
profit shares would promote effort provision.24
conditions (captured by η). This interplay is illustrated in Figures 2-3, which are drawn
in the  ) , ( β q - space. In Figure 2, which refers to the case with the wage elasticity of la-
bour demand  2 = η , the downward sloping line describes the locus of those  ) , ( β q -
combinations at which the equilibrium unemployment is invariant to the bargaining
power of the bank. On the right-hand side of this line higher credit market imperfections
will reduce equilibrium unemployment, whereas the reverse holds on the left-hand side.
In Figure 3 we illustrate the effect of changes in the wage elasticity of labour demand
(η). From Figure 3 we can conclude that more elastic labour demand induces an expan-
sion of the region in which intensified credit market competition reduces equilibrium
unemployment. This expansion continues until we approach the borderline  β − =1 q ,
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Fi gu r e 3 . Equilibrium unemployment and credit market imperfections: the role of wage elasticity of labour demand25
 
From (27), and as illustrated by Figures 2 and 3, we can generally conclude that intensi-
fied credit market competition tends to increase equilibrium unemployment as long as
the labour market imperfections, measured by the relative bargaining power of trade
unions ) (β , are large enough. This lies in line with the result of the previous subsection
focusing on trade unions operating with an outside option reflecting only the base
wages. With the introduction of profit shares into the outside option of trade unions suf-
ficiently high replacement ratios (q) might cause intensified credit market competition
to stimulate employment provided that the labour market imperfections are sufficiently
small. 
Intuitively, with attention restricted to outside options based on base wages, an increase
in the repayment rate induces (base) wage moderation and labour force mobility induces
the value of the outside option to decrease so as to outweigh the increased direct cost of
financing. As profit sharing induces base wage moderation it is natural that introduction
of profit shares into the outside option will reduce the magnitude of the employment-
enhancing "outside option" effect. For the combination of a sufficiently high replace-
ment ratio and sufficiently small labour market imperfections this reduction in the "out-
side option" effect will make the direct funding cost effects dominate. 
We can summarize our findings in this subsection according to the following proposi-
tion. 
  
Proposition 6 With a mobile labour force and with profit sharing being part of the rele-
vant outside option, intensified credit market competition will raise equilibrium unem-
ployment when labour market imperfections (measured by  ) β are large enough. But  if
the labour market imperfections are sufficiently small, intensified credit market compe-
tition will reduce equilibrium unemployment in the presence of policies with a suffi-
ciently high benefit-replacement ratio (q). Finally, higher labour demand elasticity will,
ceteris paribus, extend the region in which intensified credit market competition re-
duces equilibrium unemployment.26
VI. Concluding Comments and Policy Implications
This study has focused on the role of labour and credit market imperfections as well as
of the interaction between these for the determination of equilibrium unemployment
within the framework of the "right-to-manage" approach. In the credit market loan con-
tracts are assumed to be negotiated between financiers and firms, both possessing bar-
gaining power, while the firms and organized labour bargain over the base wage. These
two types of negotiations take place sequentially. The labour and credit market negotia-
tions have been assumed to take place conditional on the firm having committed itself
to the form of wage contract determining to what extent it makes use of performance-
related profit sharing in addition to the negotiated base wage.
The presence of a performance-related wage component in the form of profit sharing
has been shown to be a necessary condition for the relationship between the competi-
tiveness of the credit market and equilibrium unemployment. Our analysis has high-
lighted the critical role of labour mobility for the evaluation of the employment impli-
cations of intensified credit market competition. With highly limited labour mobility,
increased bargaining power of banks in the credit market will have adverse employment
effects, because it increases negotiated base wages in a straightforward way. In fact, our
study has confirmed an intuitively appealing conjecture that intensified credit market
competition will promote employment under two distinct types of circumstances: (1) a
labour force which is perfectly immobile across industries or (2) a labour force which is
mobile across industries which all adopt profit sharing as long as labour markets exhibit
sufficiently small bargaining power of trade unions and face policies with sufficiently
high benefit-replacement ratios. 
However, with a labour force mobile across industries the relationship between credit
market imperfections and equilibrium unemployment is reversed if employment at a
fixed wage complements unemployment benefits to constitute the trade union's relevant
outside option. Under such circumstances intensified credit market competition will al-
ways increase equilibrium unemployment. This relationship is shown to hold also for
cases where the outside option incorporates profit sharing schemes as long as the labour
market imperfections – measured by the relative bargaining power of the trade unions -
are sufficiently strong. We can explain such a relationship between credit market com27
petition and equilibrium unemployment in the following way. With sufficiently strong
bargaining power of trade unions in the labour markets credit market imperfections will
actually serve as a disciplining device whereby the potential of the trade union to exploit
this bargaining power is reduced in an efficiency-enhancing way. The introduction of an
additional distortion in the form of credit market imperfections improves the perform-
ance of the labour market, which suffers from a primary distortion with its roots in the
bargaining power of the trade union.
19 As our model has clarified, this happens pre-
cisely when the labour market distortion is sufficiently strong.
Our model emphasizes the "first-order" importance of institutional policies directed at
reducing the labour market imperfections under those circumstances where profit shar-
ing in other industries is part of the outside option for workers. Namely, in light of our
model society will not be able to benefit in terms of employment from intensified credit
market competition as long as the primary labour market imperfections are dominant.
From (27), and as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, labour market institutions, where the
relative bargaining power of trade unions exceeds 0.33, will under all circumstances
prevent higher efficieincy of credit markets to spill over to better employment. Such
magnitudes of relative bargaining power of trade unions – measured either in terms of
trade union density rates and/or in terms of collective bargaining coverage – do seem to
fit observations from European countries (see Nickell and Layard (1999), p. 3041 and
DICE database collected by CESifo, http://www.CESifo.de). Thus, links to other mar-
kets, such as the credit market, add to the social return from reforms reducing the imper-
fections in labour markets. This argument seems more relevant the higher is the degree
of labour force mobility.  
In a world with labour force mobility and where firms widely apply performance-based
wage schemes in the form of profit sharing, labour market policies intended to reduce
the benefit-replacement ratio can play a role in shifting the economy from a state where
the development towards intensified credit market competition harms employment into
one where this development promotes employment. Nevertheless, policies to reduce
benefit-replacement ratios  ) (q , which are high in European countries (see Nickell and
Layard (1999), p. 3045 and DICE database collected by CESifo,
                                                
19 This argument is analogous to the classical second best analysis by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57),
according to which it is not necessarily desirable from a welfare point of view to decrease distortions in28
http://www.CESifo.de), seem to play a more limited role relative to the bargaining
power of trade unions  ) (β . Finally, higher labour demand elasticity, which may result
from increasing economic integration, will potentially increase the role of policies to
reduce benefit-replacement ratios  ) (q  as higher elasticities extend the region in which
intensified credit market competition is beneficial for the development of employment. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
one particular market if several markets simultaneously face distortions. 29
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